Showing 1 - 10 of 1,309
Consider an environment with widespread externalities, and suppose that binding agreements can be written. We study …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011608412
of games with externalities and issue linkage to promote cooperation on transboundary water resources. The paper analyzes …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009500936
satiable agents, i.e., the benefit function is decreasing beyond some satiation point. In such situations externalities appear … has an increasing benefit function (no externalities) then every weighted hierarchical solution is core-stable. In case of … satiation points, it appears that every weighted hierarchical solution is independent of the externalities. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011381991
In auctions with externalities, it is well-known that the core can be empty, which is undesirable both in terms of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012843633
We develop a model of assignment games with pairwise-identitydependent externalities. A concept of conjectural …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010191642
continue to negotiate as long as there are gains from trade, and coalitions may create positive or negative externalities. The …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014035050
where contracts may impose externalities on other agents. The paper derives several properties of the Markov perfect …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014029064
unreached subgames are ignored. Due to the externalities, the profitability of deviations depends on the partition formed by the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010494524
This paper reinterprets the ? -core (Chander and Tulkens (1995, 1997)) and justifies it as well as its prediction that the efficient coalition structure is stable in terms of the coalition formation theory. It is assumed that coalitions can freely merge or break apart, are farsighted (that is,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011325128
This paper extends the theory of endogenous coalition formation, with complete information and transferable utility, to the overlapping case. We propose a cover function bargaining game which allows the formation of overlapping coalitions at equilibrium. We show the existence of subgame perfect...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008737140