We present a version of Baliga and Sjöström’s (2012a) conflict games with two asymmetric players. The players …

nothing if it loses. We study a model of war with such an asymmetric payoff structure, and private information about military … win the war unless its expected military technology is considerably worse. Our model may thus explain why defending …

income. We explain this process of democratization as a rational way for incumbent elites to wage war effectively on other … nations, as in a strategic game of international conflict handing over military spending decisions to citizens who face a …

altogether, often after substantial initial conflict. To attain peace, players must first engage in costly signaling by making …We introduce three variations of the Hirshleifer-Skaperdas conflict game to study experimentally the effects of post-conflict …

conflict and makes the ideologues more successful yet worse off. Our results rationalize "imperial peace" - long periods of … conflict. Both ideologues lose in success probability, but gain in expected utility. Elimination of the mercenary increases … stability and social peace in multi-ethnic empires, and explain why the weakening and breakdown of such empires is often …

conflict and makes the ideologues more successful yet worse off. Our results rationalize 'imperial peace' - long periods of … conflict. Both ideologues lose in success probability but gain in expected utility. Elimination of the mercenary increases … stability and social peace in multi-ethnic empires and explain why the weakening and breakdown of such empires is often …

ways of extending the standard static economic model of conflict to study patterns of conflict dynamics. It turns out that …. In particular, we are unable to study dynamic military conflict as a series of “battles” that are resolved individually … subject to this limitation. Plausible patterns of conflict dynamics emerge, which we can link to both historical conflict and …

This paper considers evolutionarily stable decisions about whether to initiate violent conflict rather than accepting a … of peaceful resource allocations that are rejected in favor of violent conflict, compared to the Nash equilibrium …

of bargaining, where offers are made, with claim stages, where one side can commit to impose surrender on the other …. Under uncertainty on the persistence of claims, long confrontations occur in the unique equilibrium of the game: war arises … both wrong. Bargaining proposals that are rejected initially might eventually be accepted after several periods of …

war because it changes the relative bargaining position between states. We find that shifts in military power are not the …In the context of international bargaining, standard models predict that a shift in military power can cause preventive … only cause of war under commitment problems and that commitment problems per se are not necessarily a cause of war even if …