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A theory of threshold contracts
Becker, Johannes Gerd; Gersbach, Hans - 2013 - This version: August 2013
We consider an in nitely repeated reappointment game in a principal- agent relationship. Typical examples are voter-politician or government- public servant relationships. The agent chooses costly effort and enjoys being in office until he is deselected. The principal observes a noisy signal of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010221102
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Costly miscalibration
Guo, Yingni; Shmaya, Eran - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 16 (2021) 2, pp. 477-506
the platform's forecast; when the miscalibration cost is high, the platform can achieve its commitment payoff in an … equilibrium, and the only extensive-form rationalizable strategy of the platform is its strategy in the commitment solution. Our … results show that miscalibration cost is a proxy for the degree of the platform's commitment power, and thus provide a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012587367
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Delegating learning
Escobar, Juan F.; Zhang, Qiaoxi - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 16 (2021) 2, pp. 571-603
Learning is crucial to organizational decision making but often needs to be delegated. We examine a dynamic delegation problem where a principal decides on a project with uncertain profitability. A biased agent, who is initially as uninformed as the principal, privately learns the profitability...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012587421
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Competition of politicians for incentive contracts and elections
Gersbach, Hans - 2001
politicians’ time preferences. In the non-commitment case, incentive contracts may need to include a golden parachute clause …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011397764
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Competition of politicians for incentive contracts and elections
Gersbach, Hans - 2001
politicians' time preferences. In the non-commitment case, incentive contracts may need to include a golden parachute clause. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014460948
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Central bank reputation, cheap talk and transparency as substitutes for commitment : experimental evidence
Duffy, John; Heinemann, Frank - In: Journal of monetary economics 117 (2021), pp. 887-903
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012603276
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Time-consistent optimal fiscal policy over the business cycle
Feng, Zhigang - In: Quantitative economics : QE ; journal of the … 6 (2015) 1, pp. 189-221
that abstract from history dependence. The welfare cost of no commitment is about 0. 22% of aggregate consumption as … compared to the Ramsey allocation with full commitment. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011757665
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Information asymmetry and the problem of transfers in trade negotiations and international agencies
Hamada, Kōichi (contributor); Sunder, Shyam (contributor) - 2005
This paper studies the role of transfers among groups within a country as well as among countries in a two level game of international trade negotiations. We show that in order to realize the intended transfer in the presence of asymmetric information on the states of recipients (and donors), a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003103117
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A theory on media bias and elections
Sun, Junze; Schram, Arthur; Sloof, Randolph - 2019
on whether media have commitment power; if not, they can worsen information transmission and voter welfare. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012030647
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Chapter 4. Reputations in Repeated Games
Mailath, George J.; Samuelson, Larry - In: Handbook of game theory with economic applications : …, (pp. 165-238). 2015
-selection approach to reputations in the context of a long-lived player, who may be a “normal” type or one of a number of “commitment …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014025455