This paper studies network formation in settings where players are heterogeneous with respect to benefits as well as the costs of forming links. Our results demonstrate that centrality, center-sponsorship and short network diameter are robust features of equilibrium networks. We find that in a...

This paper studies network formation in settings where players are heterogeneous with respect to benefits as well as the costs of forming links. Our results demonstrate that centrality, center-sponsorship and short network diameter are robust features of equilibrium networks. We find that in a...

Social institutions regulating group conduct have been regarded as necessaryfor human cooperation to transcend family bonds. However, manystudies in economics and biology indicate that reciprocity based on repeatedinteraction suffices to establish cooperation with non-kin. We shedlight on the...

Investigating the strategic advantage of negatively interdependent preferences in action monotonic games, we derive characterizing conditions both for general action monotonic games and for the subclass of action monotonic games with spillovers. Examples demonstrate the generality of our...

This paper studies network formation in settings where players are heterogeneous with respect to benefits as well as the costs of forming links. Our results demonstrate that centrality, center-sponsorship and short network diameter are robust features of equilibrium networks. We find that in a...

The industrialization process of a country is often plagued by a failure to coordinate investment decisions. Using the Global Games approach we can solve this coordination problem and eliminate the problem of multiple equilibria. We show how appropriate information provision enhances efficiency....

This note shows that the loss deviations in Selten's (1995) risk dominance measure are the same as the arguments of the probability of a strategy that supports a sequential equilibrium. Risk dominance is used to select among Nash equilibria, while sequential equilibrium, which is stronger than...

Truthtelling is often viewed as focal in direct mechanisms. We introduce two new notions of robust implementation based on the premise that society may be composed of "primitive'' agents who, whenever confronted with a strategy profile, anchor to truthtelling and make a limited number of...

Mixed-motive noncooperative games feature ambivalence in the competitive relation of the players and outcomes disobliging Nash equilibrium prescription. The Nash approach, ostensibly rational and self-maximizing, regularly advises strategy many players regard as counterintuitive or faulty. And...

This paper models the coalition formation process among primates as a sequential game. The population consists of primates having distinct social ranks. The rank of each individual is determined by his resource holding potential. Each member of the population is interested in gaining access to a...