This is the second part of a comprehensive essay on the Rawlsian view of CSR (corporate social responsibility) seen as a multistakehodler model of corporate governance. I describe the repeated game among the firms and its stakeholders so that several types of reputations, based on the full or...

This is the first part of a comprehensive essay on the Rawlsian view of corporate social responsibility (in short CSR). CSR is defined as a multi-stakeholder model of corporate governance and objective function based on the extension of fiduciary duties toward all the firm’s stakeholders. A...

Employing a political-economics approach, this paper compares small states and unions when the former fail to internalize cross-border externalities of publicly provided goods. It discusses two types of unions: federations with more than one level of government and unitary states. While unitary...

We examine the effectiveness of three democratically chosen rules that alleviate the coordination and cooperation problems inherent in collectively managed common-pool resources. In particular we investigate how rule effectiveness and rule compliance depends on the prevailing local norms and...

This paper revisits the tragedy of the commons when agents have different capabilities in both production and encroachment activities, and can allocate their time between them. Under fairly general assumptions on production and encroachment technologies, an individual's expected income is convex...

The aim of this paper is to extend Hamilton and Slutsky's (1990) endogenous timing game by including the possibility for players to cooperate. At an initial stage players are assumed to announce both their purpose to play early or late a given duopoly game as well as their intention to cooperate...

We study a simple contracting game with a principal and two agents. Contracts exert an externalities on non contractors. The principal can either contract both agents in a centralized manner, or delegate one agent to contract the other. We show that the choice of the principal depends on the...

This paper examines a class of three-agent games with a principal and two identical agents. The role of the principal is to facilitate efficient outcomes for the two agents which are not feasible in his absence. Our results show that imposing a mediator or "facilitator" on "any" two person...

Robert Aumann's agreement theorem and subsequent work shows that people who are rational in a certain Bayesian sense cannot agree to disagree on matters of fact, as long as there is common knowledge of this common rationality. This result hinges on a type of epistemic impartiality: a rational...