We conduct a series of Cournot duopoly market experiments with a high number of repetitions and fixed matching. Our … information, our data confirm the well-known result that duopoly players achieve, on average, partial collusion. However, as soon …

We conduct a series of Cournot duopoly market experiments with a high number of repetitions and fixed matching. Our … information, our data confirm the well-known result that duopoly players achieve, on average, partial collusion. However, as soon …

, collusion is much frequent. This shows, more generally, that cooperation can be observed even when individuals interact only …

We explore targeted punishment as an explanation for collusion among many firms. In a series of Cournot oligopoly … experiments with various numbers of firms, we compare production decisions with and without the possibility to target punishment … collusion. More so, we find that the collusive effect of targeted punishment is even stronger in markets with more competitors …

We study the role of communication in collusive market sharing. In a series of Cournot oligopoly experiments with …

foreclosure in laboratory experiments. In one-shot interactions, upstream firms can choose to build a reputation by revealing …

Standard models of collusion require that all firms are forward-looking and strategic. When one firm displays naive …