Thomas Schelling was recognized by the Nobel Prize committee as a pioneer in the application of game theory and rational choice analysis to problems of politics and international relations. However, although he makes frequent references in his writings to this approach, his main explorations and...

This chapter critically analyses contributions to evolutionary game theory by such writers as Robert Trivers, John Maynard-Smith, and Robert Axelrod. It develops four key arguments. First, that the behavioral propensities that manifest themselves in altruistic behavior are empirically relevant,...

In two-person generosity games the proposer's agreement payoffis exogenously given whereas that of the responder is endogenouslydetermined by the proposer's choice of the pie size. Earlier resultsfor two-person generosity games show that participants seem to caremore for eciency than for equity....

Agents interacting on a body of water choose between technologiesto catch …sh. One is harmless to the resource, as it allows full recovery;the other yields high immediate catches, but low(er) future catches.Strategic interaction in one ‘objective’resource game may induceseveral ‘subjective’...

We introduce a stochastic game in which transition probabilitiesdepend on the history of the play, i.e., the players’past action choices.To solve this new type of game under the limiting average reward crite-rion, we determine the set of jointly-convergent pure-strategy rewardswhich can be...

This lecture is a brief overview of an evolutionary theory of fairness. The ideasare fleshed out in a book Natural Justice, which is itself a condensed versionof an earlier two-volume book Game Theory and the Social Contract (Binmore[14, 12, 13])...