In this paper we consider the situation where the deterministiccomponents of the processes generating individual series are linear trendsand the individual series are independent I(0) or I(1) processes. We showthat when those time series are used in ordinary least squares regression,the...

The Hodrick-Prescott …lter is often applied to economic series as part of thestudy of business cycles. Its properties have most frequently been exploredthrough the development of essentially asymptotic results which are practicallyrelevant only some distance from series endpoints. Our concern...

We consider the possibility of estimating a Dickey-Fuller regression, constraining the autoregressive parameter to be at most one, and imposing prior knowledge of the sign of the drift parameter. ...

We present the asymptotic properties of double-stage quantile regressionestimators with random regressors, where the first stage is based on quantile regressionswith the same quantile as in the second stage, which ensures robustness of the estimationprocedure. We derive invariance properties...

We explore the extension of James-Stein type estimators in a direction that enables them topreserve their superiority when the sample size goes to infinity. Instead of shrinking a base estimatortowards a fixed point, we shrink it towards a data-dependent point. We provide an analytic expression...

We suggest an alternative way of analyzing the canonical Bergstrom-Blume-Varian model of non-cooperative voluntary contributions to a public goodthat avoids the proliferation of dimensions as the number of players is in-creased. We exploit this approach to analyze models in which the...

We examine a Stackelberg game where a financially constrainedleader faces competition from a ‘deep pocket’ follower. We analyzethe consequences of this trade-off between a financial and a strategicadvantage for both the design of financial contracts and market structure.We derive conditions...

We study aggregative games in which players’ strategy sets areconvex intervals of the real line and (not necessarily differentiable)payoffs depend only on a player’s own strategy and the sum of allplayers’ strategies. We give sufficient conditions on each player’s payofffunction to...

The paper compares two models of evolution in symmetric twoplayergames with incomplete information. One model postulates thatthe type of a player is fixed, and evolution works within types. Inthe other model type-contingent strategies evolve. In the case of twotypes and two strategies it is...

The paper shows that there is a close connection between (constant)consistent conjectures in a given game and evolutionary stabilityof conjectures. Evolutionarily stable conjectures are consistent andconsistent conjectures are the only interior candidates for evolutionarystability...