The literature on experimentation and learning typically imposes a special dynamic structure: the only connection between periods is the updating of beliefs. Hence, both the present action and present signal realization only affect the future by changing the distribution of future beliefs. In...

Typically the literature on experimentation and learning imposes a special dynamic structure: the present signal realization only affects the future by changing the distribution of future beliefs. In many contexts however the model may have "signal dependence", that is, the current signal may...

We introduce the possibility of trade in dynamic models with externalities and evaluate the consequences on the capital accumulation process, the market-clearing prices and policy making. We consider mixed economies characterized by a blend of strategic and nonstrategic sectors. An equilibrium...

We study how financial intermediation affects real market variables when an incumbent firm is threatened by entry to its market and must contract with a bank for outside funds. Contracts between the bank and the monopolist are short-term and redesigned after the entry decision of a second firm...

In this paper, we study the effect of combining two forms of economic interactions, namely a contractual relationship and a game, systematically. We compare several models with different market structures involving Cournot competition between firms in which at least one of the firms is in an...

We study how the threat of entry affects financial contracting between an incumbent firm and a bank, in a stochastic and dynamic environment. Contracts are short term and public. We determine the effects of the first period financial contract on the first period outputs in face of the threat of...