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Mechanim design and intentions
Bierbrauer, Felix; Netzer, Nick - 2014 - Revised version, April 2014
We introduce intention-based social preferences into a mechanism design framework with independent private values and quasilinear payoffs. For the case where the designer has no information about the intensity of social preferences, we provide conditions under which mechanisms which have been...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010354632
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Mechanism design and intentions
Bierbrauer, Felix; Netzer, Nick - 2016
information on reciprocity types, implementability of an incentive-compatible social choice function is guaranteed if it satises … an additional insurance property. By contrast, precise information on reciprocity types may imply that all ecient social … agents have private information about their material payo types and their reciprocity types. We also provide a systematic …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011444226
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The Framing of Games and the Psychology of Play
Dufwenberg, Martin; Gächter, Simon; Henning-Schmidt, Heike - 2008
reciprocity under which contributions are related to second- and first-order beliefs, respectively. Our results are consistent …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010265677
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Can a bonus overcome moral hazard? : an experiment on voluntary payments, competition, and reputation in markets for expert services
Angelova, Vera; Regner, Tobias - 2016
Interactions between players with private information and opposed interests are often prone to bad advice and inefficient outcomes, e.g. markets for financial or health care services. In a deception game we investigate experimentally which factors could improve advice quality. Besides advisor...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011530053
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Can a bonus overcome moral hazard? : an experiment on voluntary payments, competition, and reputation in markets for expert services
Angelova, Vera; Regner, Tobias - 2017
Interactions between players with private information and opposed interests are often prone to bad advice and inefficient outcomes, e.g. markets for financial or health care services. In a deception game we investigate experimentally which factors could improve advice quality. Besides advisor...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011697162
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Can a bonus overcome moral hazard? : experimental evidence from markets for expert services
Angelova, Vera; Regner, Tobias - 2018
Interactions between players with private information and opposed interests are often prone to bad advice and inefficient outcomes, e.g. markets for financial or health care services. In a deception game we investigate experimentally which factors could improve advice quality. Besides advisor...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011881706
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Frustration and anger in games
Battigalli, Pierpaolo; Dufwenberg, Martin; Smith, Alec - 2015
Frustration, anger, and aggression have important consequences for economic and social behavior, concerning for example monopoly pricing, contracting, bargaining, traffic safety, violence, and politics. Drawing on insights from psychology, we develop a formal approach to exploring how...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010496082
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Incentives and Equilibrium in Agency with Adverse Selection
Faynzilberg, Peter S. - 2015
We show that contracting in agency with voluntary participation may involve incentives for the agent's abstention. Their provision alters the optimality criteria in the principal's decision-making, further distorts the mechanism, and may lead to breakdown of contracting in circumstances where...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013021575
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Bayesian Persuasion and Moral Hazard
Boleslavsky, Raphael - 2018
We consider a three-player Bayesian persuasion game in which the sender designs a signal about an unknown state of the world, the agent exerts a private effort that determines the distribution of the underlying state, and the receiver takes an action after observing the signal and its...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012934709
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Hidden Action and Outcome Contractibility : An Experimental Test of Moral Hazard Theory
Hoppe, Eva I.; Schmitz, Patrick W. - 2019
In a laboratory experiment with 754 participants, we study the canonical one-shot moral hazard problem, comparing treatments with unobservable effort to benchmark treatments with verifiable effort. In our experiment, the players endogenously negotiate contracts. In line with contract theory, the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014105234