Internal inconsistencies are so commonplace in studies using the contingent valuation method(CVM) that it has been argued that that method should be abandoned as a means of preferenceelicitation in favour of other methods such as standard gambles (SG). The experiment described inthis paper finds...

This paper studies the role of public information in multiple-agent coordination problems underlying a variety of economic scenarios such as banking and debt crises. The impact of information on coordination in such settings rests on the interplay between two types of uncertainty that agents...

We consider a game where one player, the Announcer, has to communicate the value of a payoff relevant state of the world to a set of players who play a coordination game with multiple equilibria. While the Announcer and the players agree that coordination is desirable, since the payoffs of the...

This paper uses a laboratory experiment to test the predictions of a dynamic global game designed to capture the self-fulfilling nature of speculative attacks. The game has two stages and a large number of heterogeneously informed agents deciding whether to attack the status quo. In the first...

We experimentally test whether the possibility of building a reputation impacts behavior in the manner suggested by theory. Our unified reputation framework theoretically allows for either the good or the bad reputation prediction to emerge. Our design additionally varies whether reputation...

This paper considers two games, a stag hunt and a prisoners' dilemma. Each game features non-binding, costless, and free-form pre-play communication. I focus on players who verbally first suggest cooperation in each game. I study experimentally whether the frequency of verbal initiative-taking...

In many scenarios such as banking and liquidity crises, inefficiencies often arise because investors face uncertainties about economic fundamentals and the strategies of other investors. How information affects fundamental uncertainty is well studied, but how information affects strategic...

This paper introduces two simple betting mechanisms, Top-Flop and Threshold betting, to elicit unverifiable information from crowds. Agents are offered bets on the rating of an item about which they received a private signal versus that of a random item. We characterize conditions for the chosen...