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We develop a model of lobbying in which a time and resource constrained policymaker first chooses which policy …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011295655
Contests are well-established mechanisms for political lobbying, innovation, rentseeking, incentivizing workers, and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012426931
In procurement auctions, bidders are usually better informed about technical, financial, or legal aspects of the goods and services procured. Therefore, the buyer may include a dialogue in the procurement procedure which enables the suppliers to reveal information that will help the buyer to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012167341
There are situations in which competitors ally to pursue a common objective. This simultaneous presence of cooperation and competition is called coopetition and we study it theoretically and experimentally in a group contest setup. More concretely, we analyze a group contest with a new sharing...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012871693
This paper examines behavior (the oretically and experimentally) in a two-stage group contest where the fi rst stage comprises of intra - group contests, followed by an inter-group contest in the second stage. Rewards accrue only to the members of the winning group in the inter-group contest,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012014361
We consider contestants who must choose exactly one contest, out of several, to participate in. We show that when the contest technology is of a certain type, or when the number of contestants is large, a self-allocation equilibrium, i.e., one where no contestant would wish to change his choice...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012947451
We consider imperfectly discriminating, common-value, all-pay auctions (or contests) where some players know the value of the prize, others do not. We show that if the prize is always of positive value, then all players are active in equilibrium. If the prize is of value zero with positive...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014055053
become about issues before interest groups engage in monetary lobbying. For a range of issues, the policymaker prefers to … leads to intense lobbying competition and larger political contributions. We identify a novel benefit of campaign finance …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011295605
This paper studies a large class of imperfectly discriminating contests, referred to as elastic contests, that induce players to either overbid a standing bid or to abstain from bidding altogether. Many common forms of contest are elastic. In any equilibrium of an elastic contest, there is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010360312
A well-known theoretical result in the contest literature is that greater heterogeneity decreases performance of contestants because of the "discouragement effect." Leveling the playing field by favoring weaker contestants through bid-caps and favorable tie-breaking rules can reduce the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011472073