We consider a model of directed search where the sellers are allowed to post general mechanisms. Regardless of the number of buyers and sellers, the sellers are able extract all the surplus of the buyers by introducing entry fees and making their price schedule positively sloped in the number of...

This paper extends the discussion of the relationship between Bayesian stability and Bayesian efficiency in Liu(2020). We focus on the worst possible case for workers, in which firms offer workers wages exactly opposite to workers’ initial payoffs, so that workers will always enjoy a zero...

We study the alternating-offers bargaining problem of assigning an indivisible and commonly valued object to one of two players in return for some payment among players. The players are asymmetrically informed about the object's value and have veto power over any settlement. There is no...

We study the alternating-offer bargaining problem of sharing a common value pie under incomplete information on both sides and no depreciation between two identical players. We characterise the essentially unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium of this game which turns out to be in gradually...

Asymmetric information can help achieve an efficient equilibrium in repeated coordination games. If there is a small probability that one player can play only one of a continuum of moves, that player can pretend to be of the constrained type and other players will coordinate with him. This hurts...