We study ultimatum and dictator environments with one-way, unenforceable pre-play communication from the proposer to the recipient, semantically framed as a promise. After observing this promise regarding how much the proposer will offer if selected, in our treatment conditions, recipients...

Basu (1994) argues that claims above the Nash equilibrium in the Traveler's Dilemma may be an equilibrium in a model where rational players use reasoning in ill-defined categories. In this model, players may form beliefs over ill-defined strategies such as "choosing a high claim" and best...

Offers can increase in the ultimatum game if the recipient can select her proposer, both with non-competitive selection, where the recipient decides whether she wants to play with a single potential proposer, and even more so with competitive selection, where the recipient decides which of two...

We conduct dictator games in our artefactual field experiment with 11th and 12th grade students in New Delhi, India. We construct an economic status index based on household ownership of assets for our subjects. Using cut-offs from this index, we randomly match dictators to recipients who are...

Our study examines the impact of framing of tasks on dictator game choices. We specifically examine the effect of using two different framing of instructions, one of which we deem the charity frame and the other the group frame. The former frames the dictator choice in terms of giving to a...