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Anticipated international environmental agreements

Açıkgöz, Ömer T.; Benchekroun, Hassan - 2016

Consider a situation in which countries anticipate an international environmental agreement (IEA) to be in effect sometime in the future. What is the impact of the future IEA on current emissions after its announcement? We show that the answer to this question is ambiguous. We examine four types...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011565652

Self-enforcing climate coalitions for farsighted countries : integrated analysis of heterogeneous countries

Vosooghi, Sareh; Arvaniti, Maria; Ploeg, Frederick van der - 2022

This paper studies the formation of international climate coalitions by heterogeneous countries. Countries rationally predict the consequences of their membership decisions in climate negotiations. We offer an approach to characterise the equilibrium number of coalitions and their number of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013205091

Anticipated International Environmental Agreements

Acikgoz, Omer - 2016

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012977180

Adaptation to climate change and international mitigation greements with heterogeneous countries

Li, Hongxiu; Rus, Horatiu A. - 2014

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010457939

Information design in coalition formation games

Vosooghi, Sareh - 2017

I examine a setting, where an information sender conducts research into a payoff-relevant state variable, and releases information to agents, who consider joining a coalition. The agents' actions can cause harm by contributing to a public bad. The sender, who has commitment power, by designing...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011660390

Local and global pollution and international environmental agreements in a network approach

Günther, Michael; Hellmann, Tim - 2015

Increasing concerns about climate change have given rise to the formation of International Environmental Agreements (IEAs) as a possible solution to limit global pollution effects. In this paper, we study the stability of IEAs in a repeated game framework where we restrict to strategies which...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011332824

International Environmental Agreements : stability with transfers among countries

Diamantoudi, Effrosyni; Sartzetakis, Eftichios Sofokles; … - 2018 - Preliminary version

The paper examines the stability of self-enforcing International Environmental Agreements (IEAs) among heterogeneous countries, allowing for transfers. We employ a two-stage, non-cooperative model of coalition formation. In the first stage each country decides whether or not to join the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011850334

Self-enforcing international environmental agreements : adaptation and complementarity

Rubio, Santiago J. - 2018

This paper studies the impact of adaptation on the stability of an international emission agreement. To address this … levels of emissions. Finally, in the third stage, each country decides on its level of adaptation non co-operatively. We … that emissions are strategic complements in the second stage of the game. However, for the first model adaptation reduces …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011899731

Members, joiners, free-riders, supporters

Ansink, Erik; Withagen, Cees - 2016

We augment the standard cartel formation game from non-cooperative coalition theory, often applied in the context of international environmental agreements on climate change, with the possibility that singletons support coalition formation without becoming coalition members themselves. Rather,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011444079

Reciprocal climate negotiators

Nyborg, Karine - 2015

International climate negotiations have been troubled by mutual mistrust. At the same time, a hope seems to prevail that once enough countries moved forward, others would follow suit. If the abatement game faced by climate negotiators is a Prisoners' Dilemma, and countries are narrowly...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010488278

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