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Virtual implementation in Nash equilibrium
Abreu, Dilip; Sen, Arunava - 1987
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000758126
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Subgame perfect implementation : a necessary and almost sufficient condition
Abreu, Dilip; Sen, Arunava - 1987
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000758700
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Nash implementation with partially honest individuals
Dutta, Bhaskar; Sen, Arunava - 2009
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003899108
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Incentive-compatible voting rules with positively correlated beliefs
Bhargava, Mohit; Majumdar, Dipjyoti; Sen, Arunava - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; journal of the Econometric … 10 (2015) 3, pp. 867-885
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011392719
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A necessary and sufficient condition for two-person Nash implementation
Dutta, Bhaskar - In: The review of economic studies 58 (1991) 1, pp. 121-128
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001100825
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Strategy-proof social choice correspondences
Barberà, Salvador; Dutta, Bhaskar; Sen, Arunava - In: Journal of economic theory 101 (2001) 2, pp. 374-394
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001644284
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Bayesian implementation : the necessity of infinite mechanisms
Dutta, Bhaskar - In: Journal of economic theory 64 (1994) 1, pp. 130-141
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001170749
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2-person Bayesian implementation
Dutta, Bhaskar - In: Economic design 1 (1994) 1, pp. 41-54
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001178833
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Implementation under strong equilibrium : a complete characterization
Dutta, Bhaskar - In: Journal of mathematical economics 20 (1991) 1, pp. 49-67
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001107835
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Virtual implementation in Nash equilibrium
Abreu, Dilip - In: Econometrica : journal of the Econometric Society, an … 59 (1991) 4, pp. 997-1021
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001108582