We present a model of boundedly rational play in single-shot 2 × 2 games. Players choose strategies based on the perceived salience of their own payoffs and, if own-payoff salience is uninformative, on the perceived salience of their opponent's payoffs. When own payoffs are salient, the model's...

How do interacting decision-makers make strategic choices? If they're rational and can somehow predict each other's behavior, they may find themselves in a Nash equilibrium. However, humans display pervasive and systematic departures from rationality. They oft􀀵en do not conform to the...

This is the first definitive introduction to behavioral economics aimed at advanced undergraduate and postgraduate students. Authoritative, cutting edge, yet accessible, it guides the reader through theory and evidence, providing engaging and relevant applications throughout

This is the first definitive introduction to behavioral economics aimed at advanced undergraduate and postgraduate students. Authoritative, cutting edge, yet accessible, it guides the reader through theory and evidence, providing engaging and relevant applications throughout