We show how to bound the effect of belief-dependent preferences on choices in sequential two-player games without information about the (higher-order) beliefs of players. The approach can be applied to a class of belief-dependent preferences which includes reciprocity (Dufwenberg and...

Call an economic model incomplete if it does not generate a probabilistic prediction even given knowledge of all parameter values. We propose a method of inference about unknown parameters for such models that is robust to heterogeneity and dependence of unknown form. The key is a Central Limit...

We study econometric models of complete information games with ordered action spaces, such as the number of store fronts operated in a market by a firm, or the daily number of flights on a city-pair offered by an airline. The model generalises single agent models such as ordered probit and logit...

We study econometric models of complete information games with ordered action spaces, such as the number of store fronts operated in a market by a firm, or the daily number of flights on a city-pair offered by an airline. The model generalizes single agent models such as ordered probit and logit...

Call an economic model incomplete if it does not generate a probabilistic prediction even given knowledge of all parameter values. We propose a method of inference about unknown parameters for such models that is robust to heterogeneity and dependence of unknown form. The key is a Central Limit...

We study inference in complete information games with discrete strategy spaces. Unlike binary games, we allow for rich strategy spaces and we only assume that they are ordinal in nature. We derive observable implications of equilibrium play under mild shape restrictions on payoff functions, and...