Narrow search
Showing 1 - 10 of 16,849
Cover Image
Common agency equilibria with discrete mechanisms and discrete types
Martimort, David; Stole, Lars A. - 2001
This paper characterizes the equilibrium sets of an intrinsic common agencygame with discrete types and direct revelation mechanisms. After presentinga general algorithm to find the pure-strategy equilibria of this game, we use itto characterize these equilibria when the two principals control...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011400396
Cover Image
Common Agency Equilibria with Discrete Mechanisms and Discrete Types
Martimort, David; Stole, Lars - 2021
This paper characterizes the equilibrium sets of an intrinsic common agency game with discrete types and direct revelation mechanisms. After presenting a general algorithm to find the pure-strategy equilibria of this game, we use it to characterize these equilibria when the two principals...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013320779
Cover Image
Self-Regulation and Regulatory Discretion : Why Firms May Be Reluctant to Signal Green
Lyon, Thomas P.; Maxwell, John W. - 2015
model the managerial decision whether to signal the firm's type through substantial self-regulation, or whether to stay in … step with the rest of the industry through modest levels of self-regulation. Self-regulation is a double-edged sword: it …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014140976
Cover Image
Three Principles of Competitive Nonlinear Pricing
Page, Frank H.; Monteiro, Paulo Klinger - 2002
We make three contributions to the theory of contracting under asymmetric information. First, we establish a competitive analog to the revelation principle which we call the implementation principle. This principle provides a complete characterization of all incentive compatible, indirect...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014033695
Cover Image
Three Principles of Competitive Nonlinear Pricing
Page, Frank H.; Monteiro, Paulo Klinger - 2002
We make three contributions to the theory of contracting under asymmetric information. First, we establish a competitive analog to the revelation principle which we call the implementation principle. This principle provides a complete characterization of all incentive compatible, indirect...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014033862
Cover Image
Barter, liquidity and market segmentation
Prendergast, Canice; Stole, Lars A. - 2001
This paper explores the private and social benefits from barter exchange in a monetized economy. We first prove a no-trade theorem regarding the ability of firms with double-coincidences-of-wants to negotiate improvements in trade among themselves relative to the market outcomes. We then...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011400851
Cover Image
Zero-Debt Policy under Asymmetric Information, Flexibility and Free Cash Flow Considerations
Miglo, Anton - 2019
We build a model of debt for firms with investment projects for which flexibility and free cash flow problems are important issues. We focus on the factors that lead the firm to select the zero-debt policy. Our model provides an explanation of the so-called "zero-leverage puzzle" (Strebulaev and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012890102
Cover Image
Zero-Debt Policy under Asymmetric Information, Flexibility and Free Cash Flow Considerations
Miglo, Anton - 2021
We build a model of debt for firms with investment projects for which flexibility and free cash flow problems are important issues. We focus on the factors that lead the firm to select the zero-debt policy. Our model provides an explanation of the so-called "zero-leverage puzzle" (Strebulaev and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013250903
Cover Image
Barter, Liquidity and Market Segmentation
Prendergast, Canice; Stole, Lars - 2021
This paper explores the private and social benefits from barter exchange in a monetized economy. We first prove a no-trade theorem regarding the ability of firms with double-coincidences-of-wants to negotiate improvements in trade among themselves relative to the market outcomes. We then...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013320760
Cover Image
Rational Signals of Weakness in a Market Entry Game
Kamphorst, Jurjen J.A. - 2013
It is well-established that incumbent firms may try to deter new market entry by pretending to be stronger than they … incumbent may prefer the opposite, namely to encourage entry by signalling weakness. If the incumbent cannot deter entry of a … potential strong entrant by itself, it may elicit entry of a weaker rm that would not enter if it were informed about the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013094960