We test infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma games with random continuation in the laboratory to capture the effect of strategic risk on co-operation. We propose a criterion building on Harsanyi and Selten's (1988) risk dominance concept and motivate it by three heuristic principles. Our...

Islamic fundamentalists and their secular opponents recognize that the decision of women to cover their head in public generates social pressures to conform on those wishing to remain unveiled. This article identifies the essence of social coordination problems generated by this type of...

We investigate the dynamic process of building trust in bilateral social interactions in the context of a repeated game with two-sided incomplete information. Our particular interest regards mutual communication of trustworthiness. The underlying stage-game resembles properties of a ''Continuous...

In this article I characterize Nash equilibria of large anonymous games by providing the following necessary and sufficient condition for an equilibrium distribution. For no subset K of actions more players play actions in K than have a best response in K to the given distribution. While...