In this paper, we develop a new model of a static game of incomplete information with a large number of players. The model has two key distinguishing features. First, the strategies are subject to threshold effects, and can be interpreted as dependent censored random variables. Second, in...

We investigate the estimation of models of dynamic discrete-choice games of incomplete information, formulating the maximum-likelihood estimation exercise as a constrained optimization problem which can be solved using state-of-the-art constrained optimization solvers. Under the assumption that...

Imposing equilibrium restrictions provides substantial gains in the estimation of dynamic discrete games. Estimation algorithms imposing these restrictions have different merits and limitations. Algorithms that guarantee local convergence typically require the approximation of high-dimensional...

The iterated Bornhuetter-Ferguson loss reserving method generates an infinite sequence of reserve formulas, with the chain ladder and Bornhuetter-Ferguson formulas at opposite extremes. The sequence also contains the Benktander-Hovinen formula. Although the literature contains parametric...

A semi-parametric, information-based estimator is used to estimate strategies in prices and advertising for Coca-Cola and Pepsi-Cola. Separate strategies for each firm are estimated with and without restrictions from game theory. These information/entropy estimators are consistent, are...

This paper studies the identification of a simultaneous equation model involving duration measures. It proposes a game theoretic model in which durations are determined by strategic agents. In the absence of strategic motives, the model delivers a version of the generalized accelerated failure...

This paper studies the identification of a simultaneous equation model involving duration measures. It proposes a game theoretic model in which durations are determined by strategic agents. In the absence of strategic motives, the model delivers a version of the generalized accelerated failure...

This paper studies the identification of a simultaneous equation model where the variable of interest is a duration measure. It proposes a game theoretic model in which durations are determined by strategic agents. In the absence of strategic motives, the model delivers a version of the...

Individual players in a simultaneous equation binary choice model act differently in different environments in ways that are frequently not captured by observables and a simple additive random error. This paper proposes a random coefficient specification to capture this type of heterogeneity in...

We investigate the computational aspect of estimating discrete-choice games under incomplete information. In these games, multiple equilibria can exist. Also, different values of structural parameters can result in different numbers of equilibria. Consequently, under maximum-likelihood...