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A theory of policy advice
Swank, Otto H.; Letterie, Wilko A.; Dalen, Hendrik P. van - In: The journal of law, economics, & organization 15 (1999) 3, pp. 602-614
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001434367
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Equilibrium allocations of endowment-pretension games in public good economies
Sanver, M. Remzi - In: Review of economic design : RED 9 (2005) 4, pp. 307-316
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003330176
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Finanzmarktmanipulationen am Beispiel von Futures bei symmetrischer Information
Haaf, Holger M. - 2007 - 1. Aufl.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003420273
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Auctions, incentives and indivisbilities
Atlamaz, Murat - 2006
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003965064
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A mathematical model for market manipulations
Singh, Bismark - In: Market risk and financial markets modeling, (pp. 209-217). 2012
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009514433
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Games of capacity manipulation in hospital-intern markets
Konishi, Hideo; Ünver, M. Utku - In: Social choice and welfare 27 (2006) 1, pp. 3-24
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003363428
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Mehr Whistleblowing, weniger Bilanzmanipulationen? : über den Abschreckungseffekt des Whistleblowings
Halim, Brian - 2018
in the latter. This is demonstrated within a game in which a manager selects his probability of manipulation and an … effect on the probability of manipulation. Whereas, a more likely detection before an audit has varying effects depending on … probability of manipulation, it can still be useful because it reduces the audit fees payable. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011952656
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The Comitology Game: European Policymaking with Parliamentary Involvement
Steunenberg, Bernard; Schmidtchen, Dieter - 2000
This paper discusses institutional reforms that might strengthen the role of the European Parliament in the policymaking process of the European Union. Using simple game theory, the paper analyzes the working properties of the different implementation procedures that are known as 'comitology'....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010296911
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Curbing Power or Progress? Governing with an Opposition Veto
Morgenstern, Albrecht - 2004
Veto institutions are often dominated by government opponents with rival electoral and policy interests (e.g. \divided government"). I investigate the tradeoff between policy control and policy blockade when both the government and the veto party may cater to opposing special interests. The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263107
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Side-Effects of campaign finance reform
Dahm, Matthias; Porteiro, Nicolás - 2005
Since campaign finance reform is usually motivated by the concern that existing legislation can not effectively prevent campaign contributions to 'buy favors', this paper assumes that contributions influence political decisions. But, given that it is also widely recognized that interest groups...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010266255