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On the (Non)-Lattice Structure of Equilibrium Sets in Games with Strategic Substitutes
Roy, Sunanda - 2020
This paper studies models where the optimal response functions under consideration are non-increasing in endogenous variables, and weakly increasing in exogenous parameters. Such models include games with strategic substitutes, and include cases where additionally, some variables may be...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012824357
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Finding all minimal CURB sets
Klimm, Max; Weibull, Jörgen W. - 2009
replies to all probabilistic beliefs over the set. We present an algorithm that computes all minimal sCURB sets in any given … finite game. Runtime measurements on two-player games (where the concepts of CURB and sCURB coincide) show that the algorithm … is considerably faster than the earlier developed algorithm, that of Benisch et al. (2006). -- curb sets ; rational …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003912049
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Equilibria with Coordination Failures
Herings, P. Jean-Jacques; van der Laan, Gerard; Talman, Dolf - 2005
This paper extends the recent literature on equilibria with coordination failures to arbitrary convex sets of admissible prices. We introduce a new equilibrium concept, called quantity constrained equilibrium (QCE), giving a unified treatment to all cases considered in the literature so far. At...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014068262
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Paul Samuelson’s critique and equilibriumconcepts in evolutionary game theory
Joosten, Reinoud - Max-Planck-Gesellschaft zur Förderung der Wissenschaften - 2009
We present two new notions of evolutionary stability, the trulyevolutionarily stable state (TESS) and the generalized evolutionarilystable equilibrium (GESE). The GESE generalizes the evolutionar-ily stable equilibrium (ESE) of Joosten [1996]. An ESE attracts allnearby trajectories...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009022153
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THE GEOMETRY OF AGGREGATIVE GAMES
Cornes, Richard; Hartley, Roger E. - University <Nottingham> / Department of Economics - 2005
We study aggregative games in which players’ strategy sets areconvex intervals of the real line and (not necessarily differentiable)payoffs depend only on a player’s own strategy and the sum of allplayers’ strategies. We give sufficient conditions on each player’s payofffunction to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005868768
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Equilibrium Non-Existence in Generalized Games
Tóbiás, Áron - 2020
A generalized game is a strategic situation in which agents' behavior restricts their opponents' available action choices, giving rise to interdependencies in terms of what strategy profiles remain mutually feasible. This paper proposes a novel example of a simple generalized game in which the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012833623
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Chapter 13. Local Interactions
zgr, Onur - In: Handbook of social economics : volume 1, (pp. 587-644). 2011
Local interactions refer to social and economic phenomena where individuals' choices are influenced by the choices of others who are close to them socially or geographically. This represents a fairly accurate picture of human experience. Furthermore, since local interactions imply particular...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014025690
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Markov distributional equilibrium dynamics in games with complementarities and no aggregate risk
Balbus, Lukasz; Dziewulski, Pawel; Reffett, Kevin L.; … - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 17 (2022) 2, pp. 725-762
We present a new approach to studying equilibrium dynamics in a class of stochastic games with a continuum of players with private types and strategic complementarities. We introduce a suitable equilibrium concept, called Markov Stationary Nash Distributional Equilibrium (MSNDE), prove its...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013273776
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Competitive Outcomes and Endogenous Coalition Formation in an N-Person Game
Sun, Ning; Trockel, Walter; Yang, Zaifu - 2004
In this paper we study competitive outcomes and endogenous coalition formation in a cooperative n-person transferable utility (TU) game from the viewpoint of general equilibrium theory. For any given game, we construct a competitive exchange coalition production economy corresponding to the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014068636
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Universally Stable Adjustment Processes : A Unifying Approach
Herings, P. Jean-Jacques - 2000
Both in game theory and in general equilibrium theory there exists a number of universally stable adjustment processes. In game theory these processes typically serve the role of selecting a Nash equilibrium. Examples are the tracing procedure of Harsanyi and Selten or the equilibrium selection...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014160968