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Perfection and stability of stationary points with applications to noncooperative games

Laan, Gerard van der; Talman, Dolf; Yang, Zaifu - 2002

It is well known that an upper semi-continuous compact- and convex-valued mapping fi from a nonempty compact and convex set X to the Euclidean space of which X is a subset has at least one stationary point, being a point in X at which the image fi(x) has a nonempty intersection with the normal...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011327822

On the (Non)-Lattice Structure of Equilibrium Sets in Games with Strategic Substitutes

Roy, Sunanda - 2020

This paper studies models where the optimal response functions under consideration are non-increasing in endogenous variables, and weakly increasing in exogenous parameters. Such models include games with strategic substitutes, and include cases where additionally, some variables may be...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012824357

Homotopy Methods to Compute Equilibria in Game Theory

Herings, P. Jean-Jacques - 2011

expositions of the Lemke-Howson algorithm and the Van den Elzen-Talman algorithm to compute Nash equilibria in 2-person games, and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013124577

Finding all minimal CURB sets

Klimm, Max; Weibull, Jörgen W. - 2009

replies to all probabilistic beliefs over the set. We present an algorithm that computes all minimal sCURB sets in any given … finite game. Runtime measurements on two-player games (where the concepts of CURB and sCURB coincide) show that the algorithm … is considerably faster than the earlier developed algorithm, that of Benisch et al. (2006). -- curb sets ; rational …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003912049

Chapter 44 Non-zero-sum two-person games

Raghavan, T.E.S. - In: Handbook of game theory with economic applications : …, (pp. 1687-1721). 2002

Nash equilibrium in completely mixed games, are very special to two-person games. The Lemke-Howson algorithm and … Rosenmüller's algorithm which locate a Nash equilibrium in finite arithmetic steps are not extendable to general n -person games …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014024501

A Numerical Algorithm to Find All Scalar Feedback Nash Equilibria

Engwerda, Jacob Christiaan - 2013

In this note we generalize a numerical algorithm presented in [9] to calculate all solutions of the scalar algebraic …-quadratic differential game. The algorithm is based on calculating the positive roots of a polynomial matrix …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013076437

Stochastic stability in finite extensive-form games of perfect information

Xu, Zibo - 2013

We consider a basic stochastic evolutionary model with rare mutation and a best-reply (or better-reply) selection mechanism. Following Young's papers, we call a state stochastically stable if its long-term relative frequency of occurrence is bounded away from zero as the mutation rate decreases...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009727120

THE GEOMETRY OF AGGREGATIVE GAMES

Cornes, Richard; Hartley, Roger E. - University <Nottingham> / Department of Economics - 2005

We study aggregative games in which players’ strategy sets areconvex intervals of the real line and (not necessarily differentiable)payoffs depend only on a player’s own strategy and the sum of allplayers’ strategies. We give sufficient conditions on each player’s payofffunction to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005868768

Paul Samuelson’s critique and equilibriumconcepts in evolutionary game theory

Joosten, Reinoud - Max-Planck-Gesellschaft zur Förderung der Wissenschaften - 2009

We present two new notions of evolutionary stability, the trulyevolutionarily stable state (TESS) and the generalized evolutionarilystable equilibrium (GESE). The GESE generalizes the evolutionar-ily stable equilibrium (ESE) of Joosten [1996]. An ESE attracts allnearby trajectories...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009022153

Chapter 13. Local Interactions

zgr, Onur - In: Handbook of social economics : volume 1, (pp. 587-644). 2011

Local interactions refer to social and economic phenomena where individuals' choices are influenced by the choices of others who are close to them socially or geographically. This represents a fairly accurate picture of human experience. Furthermore, since local interactions imply particular...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014025690