We survey the recent empirical literature on structural models of market entry and spatial competition in oligopoly retail industries. We start with the description of a framework that encompasses various models that have been estimated in empirical applications. We use this framework to discuss...

We consider the presence of first-mover advantage or disadvantage in a duopoly model of product positioning in which firms are symmetric, except for order of entry. We study a generalization of the Hotelling model, in which a consumer's utility from a product depends on the location of product...

This note presents a simple algorithm for characterizing the set of pure strategy Nash equilibria in a broad class of entry games. The algorithm alleviates much of the computational burden associated with recently developed econometric techniques for estimating payoff functions inferred from...

We set up a sequential merger game to study a firm's incentives to pass up on an opportunity to merge with another firm. We find that such incentives may exist when there are efficiency gains from a merger, firms are of different sizes, there is an antitrust authority present to approve mergers,...

This paper analyses the incentives to adopt cost-reducing technology by firms in a horizontally differentiated industry. In our model there are several suppliers of a new technology. The extent of the cost reduction depends on the quality of the new technology. A firm has to buy the technology...

Conjectural variation models are popular in empirical research as they infer the degree of market power from real data. IO-theorists, however disapprove it for lack of theoretical foundation arguing that dynamic reactions are forced into a static model with the strategy space and time horizon...

To be represented by more than one contestant in a contest has advantages and disadvantages. This paper determines the conditions under which it is favorable to send several agents into the contest. -- contests ; Divisionalization ; delegation

The seminal paper by Salant, Switzer and Reynolds (1983) showed that merger in a standard Cournot framework with linear demand and linear costs is not profitable unless a large majority of the firms are involved in the merger. However, many strategic aspects matter for firm competition such as...

An experiment is designed to test the equilibria typically studied in the repeated game literature (i.e. those based on Nash reversion and optimal symmetric two-phase punishment strategies). One hundred pairs of subjects repeatedly set prices in a differentiated demand duopoly setting. Unlike...

Sales are a widespread and well-known phenomenon that has been documented in several product markets. Regularities in such periodic price reductions appear to suggest that the phenomenon cannot be entirely attributed to random variations in supply, demand, or the aggregate price level. Certain...