For our experiment on corruption, we designed a coordination game to model the influence of risk attitudes, beliefs … failed to explain their choices between corrupt and non-corrupt behavior. Instead, beliefs appeared to be a better predictor …

. Besides making choices, decision makers have to state their first- and second-order beliefs. We find that teams play the Nash … strategy significantly more often, and their choices are more often consistent by being a best reply to first order beliefs. We … to textbook rationality. Using a mixture model, the estimated probability to play strategically is 62% for teams, but …

making choices, subjects have to state their first- and second-order beliefs. We find that choices are more often a best … reply to beliefs if any player has a dominant strategy and equilibrium payoffs are not too unequal. Using a mixture model we … can estimate for each subject the probability to be any of eight different strategic and non-strategic types. The …