A tractable model of the formation of financial networks is developed, allowing the use of concepts from portfolio theory. The optimal financial network maximizes a Sharpe ratio defined for financial networks, whereas the equilibrium financial network emerges from banks bargaining over future...

A tractable model of the formation of financial networks is developed, allowing the use of concepts from portfolio theory. The optimal financial network maximizes a Sharpe ratio defined for financial networks, whereas the equilibrium financial network emerges from banks bargaining over future...

We present a model in which an insider (i.e., manager or CEO) and an informed outsider (i.e., analyst or professional) have heterogeneous beliefs on their shared information about a risky asset and analyze the insider's incentive to voluntarily disclose this information to the public. We find...

We analyze a canonical binary-action coordination game under the global games framework. To reduce coordination failure, we propose a novel intervention program that screens agents based on their heterogeneous interim beliefs. Compared with conventional government-guarantee type of programs, it...

I study the effect of public information disclosure in a market setting where private information acquisition exhibits strategic complementarity. To overcome the issue of equilibrium multiplicity, I introduce heterogeneous information cost and imperfect information on the cost distribution. The...

This paper aims to study the impact of costly and private information acquisition in global games with applications in financial crisis (e.g. bank runs, currency crisis). While exogenous asymmetric information has been shown to select a unique equilibrium, we show that the endogenous costly...