We apply the dynamic stochastic framework proposed by recent evolutionaryliterature to the class of strict supermodular games when two simplebehavior rules coexist in the population, imitation and myopic optimization. We assume that myopic optimizers are able to see how well their payoff...

Bergin and Lipman (1996) show that the refinement effect from the random mutations in the adaptive dynamics in Kandori, Mailath and Rob (1993) and Young (1993) is due to restrictions on how these mutation rates vary across population states. We here model these mutation rates as endogenously...

Evolutionary theorizing has a long tradition in economics. Only recently has this approach been brought into the framework of non-cooperative game theory. Evolutionary game theory studies the robustness of strategic behaviour with respect to evolutionary forces in the context of games played...

The paper shows that there is a close connection between (constant)consistent conjectures in a given game and evolutionary stabilityof conjectures. Evolutionarily stable conjectures are consistent andconsistent conjectures are the only interior candidates for evolutionarystability...