We show that debt is sustainable at a competitive equilibrium based solely on the reputation for repayment; that is, even without collateral or legal sanctions available to creditors. In an incomplete asset market, when the rate of interest falls recurrently below the rate of growth of the...

We study an equilibrium-based continuous asset pricing problem for the securities market. In the previous work [16], we have shown that a certain price process, which is given by the solution to a forward backward stochastic differential equation of conditional McKean-Vlasov type, asymptotically...

This paper studies an exchange economy with a finite number of agents in which each agent is initially endowed with a finite number of (personalized) indivisible commodities. We observe that the core equivalence theorem may not hold for this economy when the coalitional form game is generated in...

We study a strategic market game with finitely many traders, infinite horizon and real assets. To this standard framework (see, e.g. Giraud and Weyers, 2004) we add two key ingredients: First, default is allowed at equilibrium by means of some collateral requirement for financial assets; second,...

The present paper introduces a model of dynamic equilibrium in a market, based on game theoretic approach, with specific development for capital markets and corporate strategies. The model allows to study some aspects of structural change in markets, both its dynamics and qualitative aspects. An...

Evolutionary Finance focuses on questions of "survival and extinction" of investment strategies (portfolio rules) in the market selection process. It analyzes stochastic dynamics of financial markets in which asset prices are determined endogenously by a short-run equilibrium between supply and...

We adapt the core concept to deal with economies in which trade in assets takes place at period 1, uncertainty about asset payoffs is released at period 2, and agents trade in commodities afterwards. We define the weak sequential core as the set of allocations that are stable against coalitional...

The literatures on bounded and ecological rationality are built on adaptationism—and its associated modular, cognitivist and computational paradigm—that does not address or explain the evolutionary origins of rationality. We argue that the adaptive mechanisms of evolution are not sufficient...

We consider dynamic stochastic economies with heterogeneous agents and introduce the concept of uniformly self-justified equilibria (USJE)---temporary equilibria for which forecasts are best uniform approximations to a selection of the equilibrium correspondence. In a USJE, individuals'...