Sick-pay is a common provision in labor contracts. It insures workersagainst a sudden loss of income due to unexpected absences andhelps them smooth consumption. Therefore, many governments findsick-pay socially desirable and choose to mandate its provision. Butsick-pay is not without its...

This study explores the effect of several personal religion-related variables on social behaviour, using three paradigmatic economic games: the dictator (DG), ultimatum (UG), and trust (TG) games. A large carefully designed sample of a Spanish urban adult population (N=766) is employed. From...

This study explores the effect of several personal religion-related variables on social behaviour, using three paradigmatic economic games: the dictator (DG), ultimatum (UG), and trust (TG) games. A large carefully designed sample of a Spanish urban adult population (N=766) is employed. From...

Experiment participants in a social dilemma game choose cooperation over defection, even though neither is more beneficial. High levels of cooperation cannot be explained by favorable labels for actions, collusion, k-level reasoning, quantal response behavior, or misplaced optimism about others'...

An extensive experimental literature has documented miscoordination in establishing cooperative relationships when they can be supported in indefinitely repeated games: some people systematically try to cooperate, while others do not. The literature has had little success in finding personal...

We contrast a standard deterministic signaling game with a variant where the signal-generating mechanism is subject to stochastic perturbations. In the theoretical part, we obtain a unique equilibrium with stochastic signals. This equilibrium is separating and has intuitive comparative-static...

This paper uses a laboratory experiment to test the predictions of a dynamic global game designed to capture the self-fulfilling nature of speculative attacks. The game has two stages and a large number of heterogeneously informed agents deciding whether to attack the status quo. In the first...

We experimentally test whether the possibility of building a reputation impacts behavior in the manner suggested by theory. Our unified reputation framework theoretically allows for either the good or the bad reputation prediction to emerge. Our design additionally varies whether reputation...

We study the interaction of the effects of the strategic environment and communication on the observed levels of cooperation in two-person finitely repeated games with a Pareto-inefficient Nash equilibrium. We replicate previous findings that point to higher levels of tacit cooperation under...

We study the determinants of efficient behavior in stag hunt games (2x2 symmetric coordination games with Pareto ranked equilibria) using both data from eight previous experiments on stag hunt games and data from a new experiment which allows for a more systematic variation of parameters. In...