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I investigate the decision problem of a player in a game of incomplete information who faces uncertainty about the other players' strategies. I propose a new decision criterion which works in two steps. First, I assume common knowledge of rationality and eliminate all strategies which are not...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011946016
Predictions under common knowledge of payoffs may differ from those under arbitrarily, but finitely, many orders of mutual knowledge; Rubinstein's (1989)Email game is a seminal example. Weinstein and Yildiz (2007) showed that the discontinuity in the example generalizes: for all types with...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012159030
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rationalizable implementation. Set-monotonicity is much weaker than Maskin monotonicity, which is the key condition for Nash … implementation and which also had been shown to be necessary for rationalizable implementation of social choice functions. Set …-monotonicity reduces to Maskin monotonicity in the case of functions. We conclude that the conditions for rationalizable implementation are …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011483605
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This paper proposes the solution concept of interim correlated rationalizability, and shows that all types that have …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011702628
We define and analyze a "strategic topology'' on types in the Harsanyi-Mertens-Zamir universal type space, where two types are close if their strategic behavior is similar in all strategic situations. For a fixed game and action define the distance between a pair of types as the difference...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011703019
for some arbitrarily close type. Hence, refinements of rationalizability are not robust. This negative result is obtained … rationalizability when arbitrary common knowledge assumptions are relaxed (i.e., without assuming richness). For arbitrary spaces of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011686699
Under appropriate assumptions (private values and uniform punishments), the Nash equilibria of a Bayesian repeated game without discounting are payoff-equivalent to tractable, completely revealing, equilibria and can be achieved as interim cooperative solutions of the initial Bayesian game. This...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010256693
implementation with bounded depth of reasoning, discussing the role and implications of different behavioral anchors. The central …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011515723