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We introduce intention-based social preferences into a mechanism design framework with independent private values and quasilinear payoffs. For the case where the designer has no information about the intensity of social preferences, we provide conditions under which mechanisms which have been...
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reciprocity under which contributions are related to second- and first-order beliefs, respectively. Our results are consistent …
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information on reciprocity types, implementability of an incentive-compatible social choice function is guaranteed if it satises … an additional insurance property. By contrast, precise information on reciprocity types may imply that all ecient social … agents have private information about their material payo types and their reciprocity types. We also provide a systematic …
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Games that appear to be independent, involving none of the same players, may be related by emotions of reciprocity … Kirchsteiger’s model of sequential reciprocity (Games Econ Behav 47(2):268–298, 2004) to groups of individuals and define a new … “sequential group reciprocity equilibrium” for which we prove its existence. We study the case of two games with two players in …
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We study individuals who can choose how to compete with an opponent for one nonzero payoff. They can either nudge themselves into a fair set of rules where they have the same information and actions as their opponent, or into unfair rules where they spy, sabotage or fabricate their opponent's...
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Do individuals prefer to compete fairly, or unfairly with an opponent? We study individuals who can choose how to compete for one ex-post nonzero payoff. They can either nudge themselves into a fair set of rules where they have the same information and actions as their opponent, or into unfair...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011349331