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relevant information, we also assume that lobbies engage in non-negligible informational lobbying. We focus on a single … lobbying so that less policy relevant information is available and as a result political decisions become less efficient. …
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We experimentally investigate how players with opposing views compete for influence through strategic targeting in networks. We varied the network structure, the relative influence of the opponent, and the heterogeneity of the nodes' initial opinions. Although most players adopted a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015069374
Our purpose is to show how large difference of beliefs induced by fear of crashesis amenable to large and persistent price responses to contemporaneous shocks. Weconstruct a pure exchange economy populated by two agents who estimate strictlydifferent models regarding the fundamental. In...
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This paper presents an equilibrium model in a pure exchange economywhen investors have three possible sources of heterogeneity. Investorsmay differ in their beliefs, in their level of risk aversion andin their time preference rate. We study the impact of investors heterogeneityon equilibrium...
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members of an information sharingCooperative. Once collected, information about the location of productive sh-ing sites is an … excludable public good. We show that independent shermen donot internalize the full value of information and do not replicate rst …-best searchpatterns. An information sharing Cooperative faces a free-riding problem as eachmember prefers that another undertake costly …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009360718
,questions whether norm deviations can be detected and thus punished. By investing in information acquisition, aresponder in an ultimatum … can be rather high (‘high payoff mode’) orlow (‘low payoff mode’). The responder can buy information about the proposer … buy reward information (30 out of 55). Buyingreward information on average did not help the responder nor did it improve …
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