Different evaluators typically disagree how to rank different candidates since theycare more or less for the various qualities of the candidates. It is assumed that allevaluators submit vector bids assigning a monetary bid for each possible rank order.The rules must specify for all possible...

We consider the problem of fairly allocating one indivisible object when monetary transfers are possible, and examine the existence of Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms to solve the problem. We propose a mechanism that satisfies envy-freeness, budget balancedness, and Bayesian incentive...

We present a new three-player game in which a proposer makes a suggestion on how to split $10 with a passive responder. The offer is accepted or rejected depending on the strategy profile of the neutral third-party whose payoffs are independent from his decisions. If the offer is accepted the...

We examine ibn Ezra's procedure (Rabinovitch 1973; O'Neill 1982) historically used to solve the Rights Arbitration problem in the general framework of bankruptcy problems. When the greatest claim is larger than or equal to the estate, the procedure is a maximal game (Aumann 2010). However, when the...

We examine the Talmudic three wives problem, which is a generalization of the Talmudic contested garment problem solved by Aumann and Maschler (1985) using coalitional procedure. This problem has many practical applications. In an attempt to unify all Talmudic methods, Guiasu (2010, 2011)...

This chapter studies the theory of value of games with infinitely many players.Games with infinitely many players are models of interactions with many players. Often most of the players are individually insignificant, and are effective in the game only via coalitions. At the same time there may...

Ever since Sen crystallized the logical conflict between the welfaristic value of the Pareto principle and the nonwelfaristic value of individual libertarian rights into what he christened the impossibility of a Paretian liberal , there have been many attempts in social choice theory to...

We present a three-player game in which a proposer makes a suggestion on how to split $10 with a passive responder. The offer is accepted or rejected depending on the strategy pro le of a neutral third-party whose payoffs are independent from his decisions. If the offer is accepted the split...