This contribution deals with the fundamental critique in Dinar et al. (1992, Theory and Decision 32) on the use of Game theory in water management: People are reluctant to monetary transfers unrelated to water prices and game theoretic solutions impose a computational burden. For the bilateral...

We present a comprehensive theory of large non-anonymous games in which agents have a name and a determinate social-type and/or biological trait to resolve the dissonance of a (matching-pennies type) game with an exact pure-strategy Nash equilibrium with finite agents, but without one when...

Through building the statistical structure of game theory, this paper develops a paradigm of rationality and equilibrium to model collective and interactive behaviors for various economic ecologies from a perfect organizing corporation to a complete freedom population such as an anarchy. In...

The present paper introduces a model of dynamic equilibrium in a market, based on game theoretic approach, with specific development for capital markets and corporate strategies. The model allows to study some aspects of structural change in markets, both its dynamics and qualitative aspects. An...

An adequate description of economic dynamics requires the introduction of a monetary system including default penalties and expectations in a society whose economy utilizes money and credit. This essay notes and discusses several of the factors involved in the use of money and credit in a...

The purpose of this paper is to provide an alternative version of a generalized game, slightly different from the one provided in the seminal paper of Arrow and Debreu (1954). In this revised framework, we introduce the concept of a competitive equilibrium and show how it can be applied to a...

This paper studies the formation of international climate coalitions by heterogeneous countries. Countries rationally predict the consequences of their membership decisions in climate negotiations. We offer an approach to characterise the equilibrium number of coalitions and their number of...

This paper describes a general framework for equilibrium selection by tracing the graph of the quantal response equilibrium (QRE) correspondence as a function of the estimation error. If a quantal response function satisfies C2 continuity, monotonicity and cumulativity, the graph of QRE...

The concept of 'the core' originates in cooperative game theory and its introduction to economics in the 1960s as a basis for proofs of existence of general equilibrium is one of the earliest attempts to use game theory to address big questions in economics. Discovery of the core was met with...

The theory of large one-shot simultaneous-play games with a biosocial typology has been presented in both the individualized and distributionalized forms-large individualized games (LIG) and large distributionalized games (LDG), respectively. Using an example of an LDG with two actions and a...