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We consider a linear stochastic univariate rational expectations model, with a predetermined variable, and consider solutions driven by an extraneous finite state Markov process as well as by the fundamental noise. We obtain conditions for existence of noisy k-state sunspot equilibria (noisy...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014112340
This paper investigates the existence of unique equilibrium in two-good economies where agents have preferences with …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013220197
In this paper, we study a conditional upgrade strategy that has recently emerged in the travel industry. After a consumer makes a reservation for a product (e.g., a hotel room), she is asked whether she would like to upgrade her product to a higher-quality (more expensive) one at a discounted...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013000175
We show that all the fundamental properties of competitive equilibrium in Marshall's theory of value, as presented in Note XXI of the mathematical appendix to his Principles of Economics (1890), derive from the Strong Law of Demand. This is, existence, uniqueness, optimality, global stability of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012776601
. Furthermore, since local interactions imply particular forms of externalities, their presence typically suggests government action …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014025690
We present two new notions of evolutionary stability, the trulyevolutionarily stable state (TESS) and the generalized evolutionarilystable equilibrium (GESE). The GESE generalizes the evolutionar-ily stable equilibrium (ESE) of Joosten [1996]. An ESE attracts allnearby trajectories...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009022153
Tuning one's shower in some hotels may turn into a challenging coordination game with imperfect information. The temperature sensitivity increases with the number of agents, making the problem possibly unlearnable. Because there is in practice a finite number of possible tap positions, identical...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010264912
We show that the playing sequence--the order in which players update their actions--is a crucial determinant of whether the best-response dynamic converges to a Nash equilibrium. Specifically, we analyze the probability that the best-response dynamic converges to a pure Nash equilibrium in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013241993
to agents. Individuals have preferences over the possible types of the agents from the opposite market side and initially …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013087491
It is impossible, in general, to extend an asymmetric two-player game to networks, because there must be two populations, the row one and the column one, but we do not know how to define inner-population interactions. This is not the case for Matching Pennies, as we can interpret the row player...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013068518