I present a model of observational learning with payoff interdependence. Agents, ordered in a sequence, receive private signals about an uncertain state of the world and sample previous actions. Unlike in standard models of observational learning, an agent's payoff depends both on the state and...

This paper studies the long-run (stochastic) stability of an evolutionary model with persistent randomness in network games. We focus on evolutionary dynamics in symmetric coordination games where players choose the best responses to their opponents' strategies. Recent studies find that the...

This paper studies fictitious play in networks of noncooperative two-player games. We show that continuous-time fictitious play converges to Nash equilibrium provided that the overall game is zero-sum. Moreover, the rate of convergence is 1/T , regardless of the size of the network. In contrast,...

This paper studies fictitious play in networks of noncooperative two-person games. We show that continuous-time fictitious play converges to the set of Nash equilibria if the overall n-person game is zero-sum. Moreover, the rate of convergence is 1/T, regardless of the size of the network. In...

We define a concept of epistemic robustness in the context of an epistemic model of a finite normal game where a player type corresponds to a belief over the profiles of opponent strategies and types. A Cartesian product X of pure strategy subsets is epistemically robust if there is a Cartesian...

We define a concept of epistemic robustness in the context of an epistemic model of a finite normal-form game where a player type corresponds to a belief over the profiles of opponent strategies and types. A Cartesian product X of pure-strategy subsets is epistemically robust if there is a...

This paper brings together analyses of two-way flow Strict Nash networks under exclusive player heterogeneity assumption and exclusive partner heterogeneity assumption. This is achieved through examining how the interactions between these two assumptions influence important properties of Strict...

This paper brings together analyses of two-way flow Strict Nash networks under exclusive player heterogeneity assumption and exclusive partner heterogeneity assumption. This is achieved through examining how the interactions between these two assumptions influence important properties of Strict...

This paper establishes the uniqueness of a Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE) for a broad class of $n$-person normal form games. We show that the uniqueness of a QRE is determined by a precise relationship between a measure of players' payoff concavity, a bound on the intensity of strategic...