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Tournaments with gaps
Imhof, Lorens; Kräkel, Matthias - In: Economics letters 122 (2014) 2, pp. 211-214
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010395184
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Observable strategies, commitments, and contracts
Wärneryd, Karl Erik - 2014
We consider rules (strategies, commitments, contracts, or computer programs) that make behavior contingent on an opponent's rule. The set of perfectly observable rules is not well defined. Previous contributions avoid this problem by restricting the rules deemed admissible. We instead limit the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010437999
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Incentives and Equilibrium in Agency with Adverse Selection
Faynzilberg, Peter S. - 2015
We show that contracting in agency with voluntary participation may involve incentives for the agent's abstention. Their provision alters the optimality criteria in the principal's decision-making, further distorts the mechanism, and may lead to breakdown of contracting in circumstances where...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013021575
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Bayesian Persuasion and Moral Hazard
Boleslavsky, Raphael - 2018
We consider a three-player Bayesian persuasion game in which the sender designs a signal about an unknown state of the world, the agent exerts a private effort that determines the distribution of the underlying state, and the receiver takes an action after observing the signal and its...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012934709
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Hidden Action and Outcome Contractibility : An Experimental Test of Moral Hazard Theory
Hoppe, Eva I.; Schmitz, Patrick W. - 2019
negotiate contracts. In line with contract theory, the contractibility of the outcome plays a crucial role when effort is a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014105234
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Observable Strategies, Commitments, and Contracts
Warneryd, Karl - 2021
We consider rules (strategies, commitments, contracts, or computer programs) that make behavior contingent on an opponent’s rule. The set of perfectly observable rules is not well defined. Previous contributions avoid this problem by restricting the rules deemed admissible. We instead limit...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013315559
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Delegation with incomplete and renegotiable contracts
Gerratana, Emanuele; Koçkesen, Levent - 2008 - This version: April 2008
It is well known that delegating the play of a game to an agent via incentive contracts may serve as a commitment device and hence provide a strategic advantage. Previous literature has shown that any Nash equilibrium outcome of an extensive-form principals-only game can be supported as a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012001777
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Why fixed rent contracts are less prevalent : weak third party enforcement and endogenous principal type
Fabella, Raul V. - 2016
inefficiency. We consider the case where the type of the principal is endogenous to contract provisions and reneging by the … show that the general contract derived nests the usual textbook contract when TPE is strong; weak TPE on the other hand … prevents the power of the contract to equal one even when the agent is risk-neutral, thus, rendering a fixed-rent contract sub-optimal. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011582250
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The role of incentives in cooperation failures
Bartolini, David - 2013
There are many situations where the best outcome is reached through co-operation and co-ordination of agents’ actions. Although this is the best collective outcome, economic agents may fail to implement such co-operative strategy. The reason for this failure may be lack of information about...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009767298
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Mechanim design and intentions
Bierbrauer, Felix; Netzer, Nick - 2014 - Revised version, April 2014
We introduce intention-based social preferences into a mechanism design framework with independent private values and quasilinear payoffs. For the case where the designer has no information about the intensity of social preferences, we provide conditions under which mechanisms which have been...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010354632