for cooperation to be part of an asymptotically stable equilibrium of an evolutionary dynamics of signaling norm …The article suggests a new explanation for cooperation in large, unstructured societies that avoids the restrictions … internalization, behavior and norm adoption. These conditions put the signaling costs of norm-adopters and non-adopters, the strength …

Economists have a long tradition in identifying the evolution of cooperation in large, unstructured societies as a … puzzle. We suggest a new explanation for cooperation which avoids restrictions of most previous attempts. Our explanation … deals with the role of internalized norms for cooperation in large unstructured populations. Even internalized norms, i …

We study the coevolution of cooperation, preferences and cooperative signals in an environment where individuals engage … in a signaling-extended prisoner's dilemma. We identify a new type of evolutionary equilibrium - a transitional … behavior, preferences, and signaling. We thereby offer an explanation for persistent regularities observed in laboratory and …

norms on cooperation. We find that under the signaling mechanism, less cooperative players disguise themselves in the rule …-following game, but this does not decrease cooperation overall. More importantly, the signaling mechanism has a heterogeneous effect … decreases cooperation in rule-breaking groups. Finally, the signaling mechanism tends to offset the decline of contributions …

Evolution of cooperation has traditionally been studied by assuming that individuals adopt either of two pure … promotes the evolution of cooperation, our investigation gives a comprehensive picture of how relatedness affects the evolution … strategies, to cooperate or defect. Recent work has considered continuous cooperative investments, turning full cooperation and …

cooperation is best reply to itself. We give the condition for the existence of the Ostrom threshold in the Nederlander …-Prisoner's Dilemma Game. For high enough cost of failure, cooperation among rational egoists is sustained. The Ostrom threshold first …