evolutionary forces in games played repeatedly in large populations of boundedly rational agents. The approach is macro oriented in …

-market entry games. More generally, the algorithm facilitates simulated maximum likelihood (SML) estimation of games with large … numbers of players, T, and/or many binary actions per player, M (e.g., games with tens of thousands of strategic actions, TM …

equilibrium under fictitious play like learning processes. We use two 4 x 4 games each with a unique mixed Nash equilibrium; one … is stable and one is unstable under learning. Both games are versions of Rock-Paper-Scissors with the addition of a … fourth strategy, Dumb. Nash equilibrium places a weight of 1/2 on Dumb in both games, but the TASP places no weight on Dumb …

turn works out for games, drawing on some recent advances in the literature. Our key examples are the long-term dynamics of …

This article reviews the recent literature on the econometric analysis of games where multiple solutions are possible … guide to identification and estimation strategies, I discuss games of complete and incomplete information separately …