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Forand, Jean Guillaume - In: Journal of economic dynamics & control 53 (2015), pp. 47-68

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011526842

How to take an exam if you must: Decision under Deadline

Huynh, Hsueh-Ling; Majumdar, Sumon - 2006

This paper uses the example of an exam to model multi-dimensional search under a deadline. When the dimension is two, an order-invariance property allows simple characterization of the optimal search policy. Behavior is shown to be highly sensitive to changes in the deadline, and a wide variety...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011940733

Optimal Market Making Under Partial Information and Numerical Methods for Impulse Control Games with Applications

Zabaljauregui, Diego - 2020

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012842492

Robust Experimentation in the Continuous Time Bandit Problem

Pourbabaee, Farzad - 2020

We study the experimentation dynamics of a decision maker (DM) in a two-armed bandit setup (Bolton and Harris [1999 … optimal experimentation strategy that turns out to follow a cut-off rule with respect to her belief process. The belief …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012852164

A Dynamic Model of Player Level-Progression Decisions in Online Gaming

Zhao, Yi; Yang, Sha; Shum, Matthew; Dutta, Shantanu - 2021

A key feature of online gaming, which serves as an important measure of consumer engagement with a game, is level progression, wherein players make play-or-quit decisions at each level of the game. Understanding users’ level progression behavior is therefore fundamental to game designers. In...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014087351

Choosing a good toolkit, I : formulation, heuristics, and asymptotic properties

Francetich, Alejandro; Kreps, David M. - 2016

The problem of choosing an optimal toolkit day after day, when the distribution of values of different toolkits is uncertain and can only be observed by carrying different toolkits, is a multi-armed bandit problem with non-independent arms. Accordingly, except for very simple specifications,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011864877

The importance of being honest

Klein, Nicolas Alexandre - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 11 (2016) 3, pp. 773-811

This paper analyzes the case of a principal who wants to provide an agent with proper incentives to explore a hypothesis that can be either true or false. The agent can shirk, thus never proving the hypothesis, or he can avail himself of a known technology to produce fake successes. This latter...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011671897

A war of attrition with experimenting players

Chen, Chia-hui; Ishida, Junichiro - 2017

A standard incomplete-information war of attrition is extended to incorporate experimentation and private learning. We …-run and long-run gains of experimentation. The extension yields qualitative impacts on the strategic nature of the problem …. The option value of experimentation serves as a credible commitment device to stay in the game, which is instrumental in …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011756011

Dynamic performance evaluation with deadlines : the role of commitment

Chen, Chia-hui; Ishida, Junichiro - 2017

We consider an environment in which a principal hires an agent and evaluates his productivity over time in an ongoing relationship. The problem is embedded in a continuoustime model with both hidden action and hidden information, where the principal must induce the agent to exert effort to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011756012

Hierarchical experimentation

Chen, Chia-hui; Ishida, Junichiro - 2015

We consider a bandit problem faced by a team of two heterogeneous players. The team is hierarchical in that one (the principal) retains the exclusive right to terminate the project while the other (the agent) focuses strictly on implementing the project assigned to him. As a key departure, we...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011343543