In a society composed of a ruler and its citizens: what are the determinants of the political equilibrium between these two? This paper approaches this problem as a game played between a ruler who has to decide the distribution of the aggregate income and a group of agents/citizens who have the...

The paper compares two models of evolution in symmetric twoplayergames with incomplete information. One model postulates thatthe type of a player is fixed, and evolution works within types. Inthe other model type-contingent strategies evolve. In the case of twotypes and two strategies it is...

The paper shows that there is a close connection between (constant)consistent conjectures in a given game and evolutionary stabilityof conjectures. Evolutionarily stable conjectures are consistent andconsistent conjectures are the only interior candidates for evolutionarystability...

Using parametric formulae under lognormality for a broad family of povertymeasures, we show that when inequality measured by the Gini coeffcient isconstant, dening the poverty line as a fraction of a central tendency of theliving standard distribution restricts the evolution of the poverty...