Showing 1 - 10 of 460
illegal gains, as often outlined in existing antitrust regulation, and detection probabilities depend on the degree of … collusion. We introduce cartel culture that describes how likely cartels persist after each conviction. Our analysis … disentangles the effects of traditional antitrust regulation, leniency, and cartel strategies. Without rewards to the strictly …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011378956
linked to illegal gains and detection probabilities depend on the degree of collusion. A novel aspect of this study is that … response to the introduction of (ex-ante and ex-post) leniency programs. We disentangle the effects of traditional antitrust … below the price under antitrust without leniency. On the other hand, for ex-post leniency, improvement is possible and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010433900
The article focuses on the effects that type I errors can have on the incentives of firms to compete, collude or engage in efficiency promoting socially beneficial cooperation. Our results confirm that in the presence of type I errors the introduction of a leniency program can have ambiguous...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010465886
This paper experimentally analyzes the cartel coordination challenge induced by the discrimination of cartel ringleaders in leniency policies. Ringleaders often take a leading role in the coordination and formation of a cartel. A leniency policy which grants amnesty to all "whistleblowers"...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010228272
This paper experimentally analyzes the cartel coordination challenge induced by the discrimination of cartel ringleaders in leniency policies. Ringleaders often take a leading role in the coordination and formation of a cartel. A leniency policy which grants amnesty to all "whistleblowers"...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010487743
We analyze spying out a rival's price in a Bertrand market game with incomplete information. Spying transforms a simultaneous into a robust sequential moves game. We provide conditions for profitable espionage. The spied at firm may attempt to immunize against spying by delaying its pricing...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011962353
are sufficiently high, trade liberalization facilitates collusion. Exactly the opposite is true if, for any given degree … of product substitutability, trade costs are sufficiently low. We also study the dependence of multimarket collusion on …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013113914
We analyze strategic leaks due to spying out a rival’s bid in a first-price auction. Such leaks induce sequential bidding, complicated by the fact that the spy may be a counterspy who serves the interests of the spied at bidder and reports strategically distorted information. This ambiguity...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012507333
antitrust regulation on the endogenous maximal-sustainable cartel price. This impact depends upon industry characteristics … including its cartel culture. Our analysis disentangles the effects of traditional antitrust regulation and the leniency program …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011377398
This study investigates the impact of cheap talk on price in a repeated Bertrand oligopoly experiment. Each participant plays 20 rounds. Participants are placed in three-person bidding groups where the lowest bid wins. During the first 10 rounds, participants are not allowed to communicate with...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012848520