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(1994) argues that persistent on-converging sequences of rates of participation with permanent forecasting errors occur due …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010487597
We apply the dynamic stochastic framework proposed by recent evolutionaryliterature to the class of strict supermodular games when two simplebehavior rules coexist in the population, imitation and myopic optimization.We assume that myopic optimizers are able to see how well their payoff...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011302143
This survey discusses behavioral and experimental macroeconomics emphasizing a complex systems perspective. The economy consists of boundedly rational heterogeneous agents who do not fully understand their complex environment and use simple decision heuristics. Central to our survey is the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011929804
We discuss recent work on bounded rationality and learning in relation to Soros' principle of reflexivity and stress the empirical importance of non-rational, almost self-fulfilling equilibria in positive feedback systems. As an empirical example, we discuss a behavioral asset pricing model with...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010227330
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010191020
This essay links some of my own work on expectations, learning and bounded rationality to the inspiring ideas of Jean-Michel Grandmont. In particular, my work on consistent expectations and behavioral learning equilibria may be seen as formalizations of JMG's ideas of self-fulfilling mistakes....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011590425
The paper studies a dynamic communication game in the presence of adverse selection and career concerns. A forecaster of privately known competence, who cares about his reputation, chooses the timing of the forecast regarding the outcome of some future event. We find that in all equilibria in a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012123351
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012842492
Experimental evidence shows that the rational expectations hypothesis fails to characterize the path to equilibrium after an exogenous shock when actions are strategic complements. Under identical shocks, however, repetition allows adaptive learning, so that inertia in adjustment should fade...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012842597
Experimental evidence shows that the rational expectations hypothesis fails to characterize the path to equilibrium after an exogenous shock when actions are strategic complements. Under identical shocks, however, repetition allows adaptive learning, so that inertia in adjustment should fade...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012842925