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(1994) argues that persistent on-converging sequences of rates of participation with permanent forecasting errors occur due …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010487597
We apply the dynamic stochastic framework proposed by recent evolutionaryliterature to the class of strict supermodular games when two simplebehavior rules coexist in the population, imitation and myopic optimization.We assume that myopic optimizers are able to see how well their payoff...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011302143
We discuss recent work on bounded rationality and learning in relation to Soros' principle of reflexivity and stress the empirical importance of non-rational, almost self-fulfilling equilibria in positive feedback systems. As an empirical example, we discuss a behavioral asset pricing model with...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010227330
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010191020
This survey discusses behavioral and experimental macroeconomics emphasizing a complex systems perspective. The economy consists of boundedly rational heterogeneous agents who do not fully understand their complex environment and use simple decision heuristics. Central to our survey is the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011929804
This essay links some of my own work on expectations, learning and bounded rationality to the inspiring ideas of Jean-Michel Grandmont. In particular, my work on consistent expectations and behavioral learning equilibria may be seen as formalizations of JMG's ideas of self-fulfilling mistakes....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011590425
Starting with a simple economic model of the value of civil litigation from each side's perspective, this paper analyses a wide range of potential litigation cost strategies, settlement offers and negotiations, together with relevant applications and insights from game theory. Specific issues...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014026078
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003947391
We study the design of monitoring in dynamic settings with moral hazard. An agent (e.g. a firm) benefits from reputation for quality, and a principal (e.g. a regulator) can learn the agent's quality via costly inspections. Monitoring plays two roles: an incentive role, because outcomes of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011865082
Consider an infinitely repeated game where each player is characterized by a "type" which may be unknown to the other players in the game. Suppose further that each player's belief about others is independent of that player's type. Impose an absolute continuity condition on the ex ante beliefs...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014060416