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Konrad, Kai A.; Skaperdas, Stergios - 1997

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000167851

Organized crime or individual crime? : Endogenous size of a criminal organization and the optimal law enforcement

Chang, Juin-jen; Lu, Huei-chung; Chen, Mingshen - In: Economic inquiry : journal of the Western Economic … 43 (2005) 3, pp. 661-675

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002985011

Leniency policies and illegal transactions

Buccirossi, Paolo; Spagnolo, Giancarlo - 2005 - First version: October 1999, Final version: September 8, 2005

We study the consequences of leniency - reduced legal sanctions for wrongdoers who spontaneously self-report to law enforcers - on sequential, bilateral, illegal transactions, such as corruption, manager-auditor collusion, or drug deals. It is known that leniency helps deterring illegal...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010366558

Optimal law enforcement when individuals are either moral or norm followers

Fluet, Claude; Friehe, Tim - In: Journal of public economic theory 26 (2024) 1, pp. 1-22

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014440835

Is the severity of the penalty an effective deterrent? : a strategic approach for the crime of tax evasion

Chiarini, Bruno; Marzano, Elisabetta - 2016

the risk of breaking the law. Although an irreducible minimum of uncertainty remains, the Nash equilibrium in mixed … can be tricky, this paper uses the crime strategic model (inspection game) proposed by Tsebelis. This model shows that any … frequency of violation at equilibrium. This result is misleading: payoffs are not independent and the crime game can not be …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011544186