The seminal paper by Salant, Switzer and Reynolds (1983) showed that merger in a standard Cournot framework with linear … demand and linear costs is not profitable unless a large majority of the firms are involved in the merger. However, many … recurring to cost savings of merger. Firms interact with each other, with customers, suppliers, their owners, and with …

convey more bargaining power to the merged entity than a horizontal merger to monopoly. In a bidding game for an exogenously … determined target firm, a vertical merger can dominate a horizontal one, while pre-emption does not occur. …

. -- merger ; asymmetric information ; oligopoly ; single crossing …We analyze a Bayesian merger game under two-sided asymmetric information about firm types. We show that the standard … prediction of the lemons market model–if any, only low-type firms are traded–is likely to be misleading: Merger returns, i.e. the …

We set up a sequential merger game to study a firm's incentives to pass up on an opportunity to merge with another firm …. We find that such incentives may exist when there are efficiency gains from a merger, firms are of different sizes, there …

The seminal paper by Salant, Switzer and Reynolds (1983) showed that merger in a standard Cournot framework with linear … demand and linear costs is not profitable unless a large majority of the firms are involved in the merger. However, many … recurring to cost savings of merger. Firms interact with each other, with customers, suppliers, their owners, and with …

critical discount factor required to sustain collusion. This result is shown to hold for Cournot oligopoly as well as for … Bertrand oligopoly when collusion is sustained with Nash-reversion strategies or optimal-punishment strategies. In a Cournot …