whenever possible, thereby develop a theory of credible communication. Predictions confirm the longstanding intuition for …

model of communication in games and investigate the importance of when communication takes place. Sending a message before … are believed whenever possible. Applying our results to Aumann's Stag Hunt game we find that communication is useless if …

Intuitively, we expect that players who are allowed to engage in costless communication before playing a game would be … foolish to agree on an inefficient equilibrium. At the same time, however, such preplay communication has been suggested as a … communication among players leads to a Nash equilibrium (NE) of the action game. Within the set of NE, efficiency then turns out to …

In classical game theory, players have finitely many actions and evaluate outcomes of mixed strategies using a von …

The notion of communication equilibrium extends Aumann's [3] correlated equilibrium concept for complete information … continuous in actions, limits of Bayes-Nash equilibria of finite approximations to an infinite game are communication equilibria …

The paper analyzes the role of the structure of communication - i.e. who is talking with whom - on the choice of … analysis of credibility, the subjects should communicate and play the Pareto optimal equilibrium only when communication is … disregard communication. The experimental data conform to our predictions: the agents reach the Pareto-dominant equilibrium only …

example because they have to obey institutionalized communication protocols. We assume that all involved in the communication …