In the paper, the concept of Walrasian sequential equilibrium is developed to formalize the notions of fundamental social and endogenous uncertainties and entrepreneurial discovery. It predicts that social sequential experiments with efficient as well as inefficient network patterns of division...

The main result of this paper states that there exists a residual subset of the set of critical economies whose associated equilibria are finite in number. We also show that this subset does not contain any open set and therefore the result is the best possible for our choice of topology...

Equilibrium models with heterogeneous agents and aggregate uncertainty are difficult to analyze since policy functions and market prices depend on the cross-sectional distribution over agents’ state variables which is generally a high-dimensional object. This paper develops and applies a...

In an infinite-time decentralized sequence economy, agents use fiat money to bridge markets as if they make trades in a centralized economy, to avoid huge transaction cost that all agents' going together must incur. The model in this paper formulates the process how agents decide the fiat...

The paper presents and studies a new concept of coalition domination for incomplete markets. It was elaborated applying a contractual approach and based on the notion of fuzzy contractual allocation, see Marakulin (2011, 2013). Core allocations are implemented by the net trades (webs of...

This paper investigates the existence of unique equilibrium in two-good economies where agents have preferences with the same relative risk aversion and different utility weights. Aggregate demand behavior is characterized in terms of both macrolevel and micro-level information inherent in the...

We show that all the fundamental properties of competitive equilibrium in Marshall's theory of value, as presented in Note XXI of the mathematical appendix to his Principles of Economics (1890), derive from the Strong Law of Demand. This is, existence, uniqueness, optimality, global stability of...

Local interactions refer to social and economic phenomena where individuals' choices are influenced by the choices of others who are close to them socially or geographically. This represents a fairly accurate picture of human experience. Furthermore, since local interactions imply particular...

We present a comprehensive theory of large non-anonymous games in which agents have a name and a determinate social-type and/or biological trait to resolve the dissonance of a (matching-pennies type) game with an exact pure-strategy Nash equilibrium with finite agents, but without one when...

This paper describes a general framework for equilibrium selection by tracing the graph of the quantal response equilibrium (QRE) correspondence as a function of the estimation error. If a quantal response function satisfies C2 continuity, monotonicity and cumulativity, the graph of QRE...