Informationen sind für den Anleger im Aktienmarkt überwiegend schädlich, insbesondere, wenn es sich dabei um öffentliche, also beispielsweise um Jahresabschluß-Informationen handelt. Dies ist das Ergebnis einer informationsökonomischen Beschäftigung mit der Frage, welchen Nutzen dem...

This paper analyzes a two-player all-pay auction with incomplete information. More precisely, one bidder is uncertain about the size of the initial advantage of his rival modeled as a head start in the auction. I derive the unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium outcome for a large class of cumulative...

We explore in an equilibrium framework whether games with multiple Nash equilibria are easier to play when players can communicate. We consider two variants, modelling talk about future plans and talk about past actions. The language from which messages are chosen is endogenous, messages are...