Previous research on public-good games revealed greater contributions by fast decision-makers than by slow decision-makers. Interpreting greater contributions as generosity, this has been seen as evidence of generosity being intuitive. We caution that fast decisions are more prone to error, and...

We consider a public goods game which incorporates guilt-aversion/surprise-seeking and the attribution of intentions behind these emotions (Battigalli and Dufwenberg, 2007; Khalmetski et al., 2015). We implement the induced beliefs method (Ellingsen et al., 2010) and a within-subjects design using...

In an experimental study, we compare individual willingness to cooperate in a public good game after an initial team contest phase. While players in the treatment setup make a conscious decision on how much to invest in the contest, this decision is exogenously imposed on players in the control...

Evidence from studies in international relations, the politics of reform, collective action and price competition suggests that economic agents in social dilemma situations cooperate more to avoid losses than in the pursuit of gains. To test whether the prospect of losses can induce cooperation,...