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Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014477044
In order to analyze the severity of sentencing, and to show how the probabilistic interpretation of strategic behavior can be tricky, this paper uses the crime strategic model (inspection game) proposed by Tsebelis. This model shows that any attempts to increase the severity of punishment will...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011544186
The OECD’s Pillar One Blueprint proposes a new taxing right, Amount A, that would shift the pre-tax profits of multinational enterprises (MNEs) from Residence and Source jurisdictions to Market jurisdictions. The Amount A formula provides multiple opportunities for both MNEs and tax...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013248926
backdating hypothesis. We suggest policy recommendations that should improve the compliance of gifts with the requirements of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012997728
compliance and participation enforcement; IEAs as repeated games; the trade-off between the depth and breadth of cooperation; the …, and shows how these approaches relate to one another. The chapter pays greatest attention to the constraint of self-enforcement … distributive and strategic roles of side payments; issue linkage; trade leakage; and enforcement relying on trade restrictions. The …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014023904
Using experiments in which participants play the role of polluting firms, we study compliance behavior with emissions …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013174118
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I investigate if, how, and why the effect of a contribution rule in a public goods game depends on how it is implemented: endogenously chosen or externally imposed. The rule prescribes full contributions to the public good backed by a nondeterrent sanction for those who do not comply. My...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011735311
This paper constructs and analyzes a rudimentary game-theoretic model to better understand the policy choice between a global minimum tax regime that operates country-by-country and one that operates based on MNEs’ global average tax rates. The paper’s findings run counter to the consensus...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013295648